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INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The role played in personality and psychopathology by cognitive 
processes has been one of the more widely discussed topics in the 
psychological literature during the past fifteen years. After a long 
period of near exile from American psychology entities such as beliefs, 
thoughts, expectations and the like have emerged with a vengeance into 
contemporary psychological thinking. 
One of the more frequently proposed ideas, stated in its most 
simple form, is that the way we think, and the beliefs we hold about 
ourselves and the world, influence the way we feel and behave; and 
that changing these beliefs or thoughts may lead to a corresponding 
change in our feelings and behavior. In general terms, the idea is 
that thinking, along with various other cognitive entities, acts as 
a sort of perceptual filter or template, a mediator through or 
according to which events are interpreted, so that the individual 
responds not to objective stimuli per se, but to his or her under-
standing of the stimuli. 
Although one might think so judging from the enthusiasm with 
which it is sometimes promoted, the idea expressed above is not a 
particularly new one. Many and diverse authors have expressed the 
basic idea involved: the stoic philosopher Epictetus (Hadas, 1963) 
said that men are influenced not by things, but by their thoughts 
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about things. Shakespeare (in Hamlet, ii, 2) wrote that "Nothing is 
good or bad but thinking makes it so." Alfred Adler (1968) believed 
that we are influenced not by facts, but by our interpretation of 
facts. Norman Vincent Peale (1951, p. 3) preached "change your 
thoughts and you can change anything. The world in which you live is 
not determined by outward circumstances nearly so much as by the 
thoughts which habitually occupy your mind." Carlos Casteneda (1972) 
argued that the world is the way it is only because we tell ourselves 
so. Casteneda believes we maintain our perception of the world 
through our internal talking. In other words, we create our worlds 
with our thinking. 
The enthusiasm this general idea has aroused lately stems not 
from the novelty of the idea but from the prospect of our being able 
to help psychotherapy patients to systematically change their cogni-
tive behaviors and thereby to improve psychological functioning. 
The methods of cognitive behavior modification espoused by Aaron 
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Beck (1970, 1976), Albert Ellis (1958, 1962, 1977), Donald Meichenbaum 
(1976), and Michael Mahoney (1974) exemplify popular techniques aimed 
at this goal. 
The intention in this study is to extend our knowledge of the 
relationship between cognition and psychopathology by testing one 
specific proposition concerning the relationship of cognition and 
affect; namely, the hypothesis voiced by Albert Ellis (1958) that the 
tendency to hold irrational beliefs underlies most of psychopathology. 
Almost everyone concerned with the understanding of psycholog-
ical distress would agree that one's perception of the world and of 
oneself are important factors in determining reactions to life situ-
ations. Indeed, this idea has been repeatedly expressed, in varying 
forms in the psychological literature since at least the early 
twentieth century. Paul Dubois, the noted French psychiatrist, pro-
posed (1907) that if we wish to change feelings it is necessary first 
of all to modify the idea which has produced them. Alfred Adler 
(1964) strongly believed in the potency of ideas and attitudes and 
was convinced that a person's behavior springs from his ideas. 
MOre recently, Kelly (1955) proposed a theory of personality 
and a method of psychotherapy based on the idea that "Personal Con-
structs," one's unique assumptions ·about the world, heavily influence 
personality. Kelly developed "Fixed Role Therapy," a technique in 
which a person was led to make explicit and, perhaps, to challenge 
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and change his view of the world by consciously adopting a role which 
was substantially different from his own. By purposely assuming the 
role of another person in a structured role play exercise, the patient 
was presumably enabled to see that different views of a given situa-
tion were possible and that these different perspectives might lead 
to different personal consequences. 
With the development of empirically based techniques for the 
systematic modification of cognitive behavior, the above line of 
thought has received increased attention. Aaron Beck (Beck, 1970; 
Beck, Rush, Shaw,& Emery, 1979), for example, has done extensive work 
in the area of cognitive determinants of emotional disturbance and 
has discussed a variety of "disorders of thought" which, in his view, 
contribute to psychopathology. "Arbitrary Inference," for example, 
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is the drawing of a conclusion on the basis of logically insufficient 
evidence. A student who fails his first college examination, for 
instance, might conclude that he is stupid and unable to handle 
college work, thus becoming depressed and possibly overlooking adap-
tive solutions to his difficulties. "Personalization," as another 
example, might result in an employee's assuming that his boss' irri-
table mood meant the boss was angry with him personally, when in fact 
the boss' mood may have nothing to do with him. Beck (Beck & Shaw, 
1977) has also described what he calls the "Cognitive Triad" in 
depression, as another example of maladaptive cognition in psycho-
pathology. Beck notes that depressed patients characteristically hold 
1) a negative, deprecatory view of themselves, 2) a view of the world 
as demanding, hostile and threatening, and 3) a pessimistic view of 
the future. 
Michael Mahoney (1974) has described a number of maladaptive 
cognitive behaviors which, according to this line of thought, contri-
bute to maladaptive emotional and behavioral responses. "Inappro-
priate Labeling," for example, involves the association of maladaptive 
labels with certain stimulus configurations, thus distorting subsequent 
behavioral and affective responses. Mahoney points out, for example, 
that anexoria nervosa patients often inappropriately label themselves 
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as "fat," leading to the generation of maladaptive dieting behaviors. 
Martin Seligman, the originator of the "Learned Helplessness" 
theory of depression, while not usually considered a cognitive 
theorist in the same sense as Beck or Mahoney, nevertheless holds 
the view that cognitive entities (in this case, negative expectations) 
lie at the root of at least one form of depression: 
.•• helplessness depression ••. its central and defining 
feature is its causal mechanism: the expectation that highly 
desirable outcomes are of low probability or that highly 
aversive outcomes are of high probability and that their 
occurrence is independent of the individual's actions. 
(Seligman, 1978, p. 169) 
Abramson and Sackheim (1977) believe depressed persons typically 
hold two apparently contradictory beliefs: first, that they are to 
blame for their troubles, and, second, they have no control over 
external events. It should be pointed out that Abramson and Sackheim 
postulate a correlation between these beliefs and depression, but do 
not specify the causal relationship between the paradoxical cognitions 
and the mood disorder. Thus, it may be that depression causes the 
negative cognition rather than the other way around. This question 
of the causal directionality between cognition and affect will be 
discussed in considerable detail below. 
Albert Ellis (1958, 1962, 1976, 1977) whose theory of the 
genesis of psychopathology is examined empirically in this study, is 
one of the authors in the forefront of what Beck and Shaw (1977) have 
called the "cognitive revolution." Ellis, unhappy with the psycho-
analytic techniques he had acquired in his training as a clinical 
psychologist, gradually developed and elaborated the idea that the 
tendency to hold certain enduring and pervasive but nonetheless 
changeable "irrational beliefs" lay at the root of most forms of 
emotional distress. 
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Ellis believes people modulate their own emotional and behavior-
al responses to life events by the way they think about the events. 
For example, a person who is fired from his job is much more likely 
to become depressed about it if he believes this means he is a failure 
and will never achieve his vocational goals than if he believed the 
loss of his job amounted to an irritating but temporary setback he 
could soon overcome. 
While acknowledging it may be incomplete or to some degree 
inaccurate, Ellis (1958) proposes the following basic list of psycho-
pathogenic beliefs: 
1) It is a dire necessity for an adult human being to be loved 
and approved by virtually every significant other person in his 
community; 
2). One should be thoroughly competent, adequate and achieving 
in all possible respects if one is to consider oneself worthwhile; 
3) Certain people are bad, wicked, or villainous and they 
should be severely blamed and punished for their villainy; 
4) It is awful and catastrophic when things are not the way 
one would very much like them to be; 
5) Human unhappiness is externally controlled and people have 
little or no ability to control their sorrows and disturbances; 
6) If something is or may be dangerous or fearsome one should 
be terribly concerned about it and should keep dwelling on the 
possibility of its occurring; 
7) It is easier to avoid than to face certain life difficulties 
and self-responsibilities; 
8) One should be dependent on others and needs someone stronger 
than oneself on whom to rely; 
9) One's past history is an all important determiner of one's 
present behavior and because something once strongly affected one's 
life, it shoulq indefinitely have a similar effect; 
10) There is invariably a right, precise and perfect solution 
to human problems and it is catastrophic if this perfect solution is 
not found. 
Before discussing the rather meager research findings bearing 
on Ellis' particular version of the "cognition causes affect" hypoth-
esis (that the tendency to hold irrational beliefs similar to those 
listed above underlies psychopathology), it may be useful to set the 
theoretical stage by presenting a sample of the studies which 
address the more general version of the hypothesis, which simply 
holds cognitive entities such as thoughts, attitudes, images etc. to 
act as perceptual mediators in the chain of events leading from 
stimulus to response. 
The literature dealing with cognitive aspects of human behavior 
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and emotion is enormous. Few serious students of psychology are 
unfamiliar with the groundbreaking efforts of renowned authors like 
Schachter (the classic Schachter & Singer, 1962, for example), Festing-
er (1957}, Rotter (1966), s·em (1970), and Staats (1975) all of whom 
have discussed the relationship of cognition to behavior and emotion. 1 
And for every well-known author there are hundreds of less famous 
workers churning out research at a prodigious rate. Ellis (1977) in 
a review of the literature lists no fewer than 987 references he feels 
support the cognitive-behavioral point of view; and he acknowledges 
the list is far from complete. Against a backdrop like this we can 
hardly presume to "review all the relevant literature.n The studies 
summarized below have been selected to represent· the general findings 
of this body of research and to capture something of the flavor of 
the elegance and ingenuity characterizing so much of it. 
Neal Miller, in his doctoral dissertation at Yale (1935, cited 
in Mahoney, 1974) presented subjects with the symbols "T" and "4" in 
random order in a tachistoscope. Subjects were instructed to pronounce 
the symbols aloud. Whenever the "T" was presented, the subject was 
given an electric shock; no shock followed the "4". The subjects 
were soon conditioned such that a significant change in GSR followed 
1unhappily, many of these landmark studies relied on the decep-
tion of the experimental subjects, a practice now looked on as uneth-
ical in most quarters. 
presentation of the "T", but not the "4." Later, subjects were shown 
a frame in which there was no symbol at all, only a vague pattern of 
random dots. The subjects, however, were sometimes instructed to 
"think T," and sometimes to "think 4" when they were shown the random 
dots. It turned out that subjects, when they were "thinking T," 
showed a significantly greater GSR than when they were "thinking 4." 
One might conclude that Miller's subjects responded emotionally (as 
measured by GSR) to their cognitive interpretation of the dots. 
Dulaney (1968) placed subjects in a hot air chamber (110° F.) 
for a concept formation task. They were presented with pairs of sen-
tences; one fit the concept and one did not, and subjects were to 
choose the sentence that fit. After a baseline period, subjects' 
choices were followed contingently by a "blast of air" which was 
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either 700, 1100 or 1500 F. Whether the air blast was delivered 
depended upon which sentence the subject chose. Each correct choice, 
i.e., one conforming to the concept, was followed by one of the three 
types of air blast. The subjects, however, were not all told the same 
thing about what the air blast meant. Some were truthfully told it 
meant they had made the correct choice; some were told it meant they 
had made an incorrect choice; and some were told the air blasts were 
delivered randomly. Thus a 3 X 3 factorial design was employed: 
relatively cool, neutral, or hot air blast; allegedly signifying a 
correct, incorrect, or random choice. Results showed that the subjects 
who were truthfully told the air blasts signified a correct choice 
learned the concepts well even when the air blasts were physically 
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uncomfortable for them; and subjects who were told the blasts meant 
they had chosen incorrectly failed to learn the concept even when the 
air blast was physically rewarding. Subjects responded to the air 
blasts in accordance with what they believed the blasts to mean, not 
according to what the air blasts "really" meant, and not in relation to 
the rewarding or punishing nature of their physical properties (temper-
ature). We again see, in these results, the crucial role played by 
the subjects' cognitions. 
Wooley (1972) gave normal and obese subjects "preloads" of 200-
or 600-calorie malted milk-type drinks, prior to an "experimental 
meal" at which the subjects' food consumption was to be measured. The 
preload drinks were labeled as either "low-cal" or "rich," but only 
half the time was the correct label on the drink. That is, a 2 X 2 X 2 
design was used: normal or obese subjects X 200- or 600-calorie 
preload drink X "low-cal" or "rich" label. At the subsequent measured 
meal, subjects, both obese and normal, ate in accordance with the 
label (i.e., with what they believed they had consumed), rather than 
in relation to the actual contents of the drinks. That is, subjects 
who were told they were drinking a "low-cal" milkshake ate more than 
subjects who thought they had had a "rich" drink, regardless of which 
drink they had "really" had. 
May (1977) trained snake-phobic and non-phobic subjects to 
generate two kinds of mental images and sentences; some were "neutral" 
and some were about snakes. Results showed both types of subjects 
responded emotionally (GSR, heartrate, and respiration) to the "snake" 
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cognitions but not to the "neutral" ones. 
The foregoing studies support the contention that one's responses 
to stimuli are to some degree influenced by what one believes the 
stimuli to mean. In each case, the experimental subjects' performance 
is understandable only if their perception of the situation is taken 
into account. 
A variety of therapy outcome studies demonstrating the efficacy 
of cognitive techniques in alleviating depression (Rush, Khatami, & 
Beck, 1975; Shaw, 1977; Novoco, 1977), reducing phobic responses 
(Hekmat & Vanian, 1971), overcoming stress reactions (Kendall, Williams, 
& Pechacek, 1979), reducing test anxiety (Goldfried, Linehan, & Smith, 
1978; Holroyd, 1976; McCordick, Kaplan, Finn, & Smith, 1979), speech 
anxiety (Weissberg, 1977), and in controlling pain (Beers & Karoly, 
1979) add indirect support to this general view. Caution must be used 
in interpreting these outcome studies in the present context since, 
in addition to presenting the methodological and interpretive diffi-
culties usually found with therapy outcome studies, they also address 
the question of cognitive involvement in psychopathology in what we 
might call a "retroductive" manner. That is, even if we assume these 
studies convincingly demonstrate the efficacy of modifying cognition 
in an effort to alleviate preexisting pathology, this still does not 
necessarily mean the cognitions thus changed had caused the problems 
in the first place. Headaches are not caused by aspirin deficiencies. 
These problems in interpretation notwithstanding, it is not 
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unreasonable to conclude that these studies, in the aggregate, demon-
strate the mediating power of cognition and, as such, support the 
general hypothesis that cognition influences emotion. They provide 
little insight, however, into the validity of Ellis' much more speci-
fic contention; namely, that the tendency to hold the 10 irrational 
ideas discussed above lies at the root of most forms of psychopathol-
ogy (Ellis, 1958). It is this much more specific hypothesis that 
concerns us in the present study, and it is to this proposition that 
we now turn. 
As was the case with cognitive theories in general, a variety 
of therapy outcome studies have been adduced as evidence that Rational 
Emotive Therapy (RET), a therapeutic approach developed by Ellis 
to identify and alter his patients' irrational ideas, is effective in 
treating public speaking anxiety (Karst & Trexler, 1970; Trexler & 
Karst, 1972; Straatmeyer & Watkins, 1974), working with marital diffi-
culties (McClellan & Stieper, 1973), the treatment of stuttering 
(MOleski & Losi, 1976), and ameliorating paranoia (Davison, 1966), 
depression (B.eck, 1974), and anxiety (Keller, Croak, & Brookings, 1975). 
As was also the case with the cognitive therapy outcome studies men-
tioned above, the RET outcome studies suffer from methodological 
prob.lems which limit their interpretation. In addition, the problem 
of "retroductive" logic discussed above applies here as well. 
DiGiuseppi and Miller (1977), in reviewing the published RET outcome 
studies, conclude the results are hopeful but far from conclusive. 
In addition to outcome studies, there have been a few attempts 
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to test the validity of Ellis' thinking using more direct methods. 
Rinnn and Litvak (1969), noting that a basic premise of Ellis' position 
is that self-verbalizations affect emotion, gave 27 experimental sub-
jects triads of sentences which were either neutral (for a control 
group) or which culminated in negative affective conclusions. For 
example, "My grades may not be good enough this semester. • . I might 
fail out of school ••• that would be awful." Results indicated that 
the subjects who self verbalized the negative sentences had signifi-
cantly higher respiration rates and deeper respiration than the con-
trol subjects. The subjects who verbalized the negative sentences 
also tended to have higher GSR's, but this test was not statistically 
significant. 
Nelson (1977) gave 156 college undergraduates the Jones (1968) 
Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT), a 100-item paper and pencil test of 
the tendency to hold Ellis' 10 Irrational Beliefs, and the Beck (1967) 
Depression Inventory (BDI). He found a significant correlation of .53 
indicating that subjects scoring high on the depression measure tended 
also to score high on the IBT. Goldfried and Sobocinski (1975) found 
similar correlations between the IBT and various measures of social, 
speech and test anxiety. 
Epstein, Fin~egan and Blythell (1979) had undergraduates complete 
the IB.T. Subsequently, the subjects saw a videotape depicting a dis-
cussion between actors posing as a married couple discussing philosoph-
ical questions. In one condition the actors agreed with each other 
on the questions, and in the other they disagreed. In both conditions 
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they avoided showing any emotions. After viewing the tape, the sub-
jects were instructed to complete questionnaires rating the marital 
happiness of the actors. The hypothesis, supported by the results, 
was that subjects who had scored high on the IBT would tend to irra-
tionally believe that disagreement between marital partners indicated 
a lack of marital harmony, and would, therefore, perceive the agreeing 
couple as more happily married than the disagreeing couple. 
The above studies are consistent with Ellis' assumption that 
irrational thinking leads to psychopathology. If Ellis is correct, 
for example, one would have anticipated that Rimm and Litvak's (1968) 
subjects would respond emotionally to the negative thoughts they were 
told to generate. Similarly, one would expect to find reasonably 
high positive correlations between measures of emotional difficulties 
and irrational thinking as was the case with the Goldfried and Sobo-
cinski (1975) and Nelson (1977) studies. One would also have antici-
pated the Epstein et al. (1979) finding. 
However, affirming the above studies to be consistent with 
Ellis' hypothesis is not to say they support it. The Rimm and Litvak 
(1968) finding, for example, deals with very short-term emotional 
phenomena (GSR, heartrate, etc.) and even if we were willing to assume 
the study was faultlessly valid internally, few theoreticians would 
be willing to generalize from this to so enduring and complex a 
phenomenon as "psychopathology." The Goldfried and Sobocinski (1975) 
and the Nelson (1977} correlational studies also fall short of support-
ing the Ellis hypothesis since Ellis says the irrational thinking 
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causes the emotional difficulty and based on correlational data alone 
it would be just as valid to infer the opposite causal sequence. 
The Epstein et al. (1979) results address certain social perceptions 
of people with varying degrees of irrational thinking, but say little 
about the subjects' emotional responses to these perceptions and much 
less about the topic of emotional disturbance. 
The present study attempts to go beyond the above studies in 
several important ways. It directly examines the concept of psycho-
pathology (in this case, depression) rather than short-term emotional 
responses as in Rimm and Litvak, or social perception as in Epstein 
et al. Secondly, the present study assesses the causal relationship 
between irrational thinking and depression left unanswered by the 
Nelson (1977) study. Additionally, this study will, by using addition-
al measures of depression, either add to or set parameters upon the 
generality of Nelson's findings. 
Hypotheses 
1. As suggested by the finding of Nelson (1977} it is hypothe-
sized that a positive association will be found between irrational 
thinking and depression. 
2. It is predicted that the causal relationship between the 
tendency to hold the ten irrational beliefs discussed above and the 
tendency to show signs of clinical depression will not be a simple 
unidirectional one, but rather, will involve partial reciprocal 
causality, with each variable effecting the other to some degree 
over time. 
3. Finally, in accordance with the theoretical position of 
Albert Ellis, it is expected that, although the causal relationship 
between irrational thinking and depression is predicted to be par-
tially reciprocal in nature, the preponderance of causal potency 
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will lie in the direction of irrational thinking leading to depression 
rather than the other way around. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 100 Loyola University of Chicago undergraduates 
who had volunteered to participate in the study. All were enrolled in 
an undergraduate psychology course at the time they volunteered, and 
all who eventually fulfilled their commitment received partial course 
credit for their participation. 
Measures 
The psychological tests used in this study consisted of a measure 
of irrational thinking and three separate measures of depression. 
Each will no~ be briefly described. 
The Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT). The IBT was developed by 
R. G. Jones (1968) specifically to measure the degree to which an 
individual holds Ellis' ten irrational beliefs described above. It is 
a Likert-type self-report inventory which asks the respondent to in-
dicate the degree to which he agrees or disagrees with 100 statements 
which relate to the Ellis irrational beliefs. The test supplies 10 
subscale scores, each relating to one of the ten irrational beliefs, 
and an overall irrationality score. In general, Jones reports satis-
factory reliability and concurrent validity values, although those for 
the subscales are less convincing than those for the full scale scores. 
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A subsequent report (Nelson, Note 1) agrees that the full scale score 
is sufficiently reliable and valid for research purposes but casts 
doubt on the usability of the subscales. For this reason, only the 
full scale scores were used in the present study. Full scale scores 
can conceivably range from 100 to 500, but scores below 200 or above 
400 are very rare. Jones reported a mean score of 292 and a standard 
deviation of 32. 
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Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). The Beck Depression Inventory 
(Beck, 1970; Beck, Ward, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) is a "paper and pencil" 
inventory of depressive characteristics designed to assess the degree 
of depressive symptomology present in psychiatric patients. It con-
sists of 21 multiple choice self-report items. Possible scores range 
from 0 to 63, with Beck Categorizing Scores of 0 to 9 as not depressed, 
10 to 15 as mildly depressed, 16 to 23 as moderately depressed and 24 
to 63 as severely depressed. 
Although the BDI was originally developed for use with psychiatric 
populations, Bumberry, Oliver and McClure (1978) validated the instru-
ment in a college setting by comparing the estimates of depression 
yielded by the BDI to those obtained in psychiatric interviews with 
the same subjects. The resulting validity coefficient was .77, and 
Bumberry et al. concluded the BDI is a valid instrument for assessing 
the degree of depression present in college students. 
The Lubin Depression Adjective Checklist, Form C (DACL). The 
DACL (Lubin, 1967) is a 32-item adjective checklist containing 22 
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negative (e.g., blue, deserted) and ten positive (e.g., peaceful, 
lucky) items. It is a widely used and respected measure of depression; 
Goodstein in his review of the DACL for the Seventh Mental Measurements 
Yearbook (Buras, 1972) wrote that the DACL was, at that time, clearly 
the most psychometrically sophisticated and potentially useful instru-
ment available for the assessment of depression. The manual (Lubin, 
1967) provides validity and reliability information of a scope and 
quality seldom found in research instruments of this type. 
The MMPI D-Scale. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inven-
tory D-scale (MMPI-D) constitutes the final measure of depression used 
in this investigation. The MMPI-D consists of the 60 true or false 
items which make up the depression scale of the MMPI. It was shown in 
the original empirical studies (Hathaway & McKinley, 1951) and many 
subsequent cross-validations (Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1972) to 
reliably distinguish depressed patients from other psychiatric patients 
as well as from normals. 
Procedures 
The cross-lagged panel analysis (CLPA) (Crano, Kenny, & Caro.pb.ell, 
1972) was used in this study. The CLPA is a data analysis technique 
which enables the user to make tentative causal inferences based solely 
on correlational data, and it allows for an analysis of the causal 
interplay between variables over time. It requires the collection of 
to-be-correlated data at a minimum of two different points in time, and 
it uses the temporal relationships involved to clarify the causal 
relationships among the variables. A diagram (See Figure I) will be 
helpful in explaining how this works. Let us say that test scores 
measuring two variables of interest, Vl and V2, are collected from the 
same subjects at two different points in time, A and B. Correlations 
AV1/AV2 and BV1/BV2 are referred to as the synchronous correlations 
and quantify the associations between Vl and V2 at time-points A and 
20 
B. Differences between these two coefficients result from changes in 
the strength of association between the two variables over the time 
period involved as well as the less than perfect reliability and valid-
ity of the measures employed. 
The special values this analysis was designed to provide, however, 
those which shed light on the causal interplay between the variables, 
'are the cross-lagged correlations AV1/AV2 and AV2/AV1. Each of these 
correlations represents the association of ~rior values in one variable 
to subsequent values in the other. For example, correlation AV1/AV2 
quantifies the tendency of a person scoring high (or low) on Vl at time 
point A to score high (or low) on V2 at time point B. The other cross-
lagged correlation, AV2/BV1, does exactly the opposite; that is, it 
measures the degree to which prior performance in V2 predicts subse-
quent performance in Vl. 
It is a basic assumption of our scientific world-view that causes 
precede their effects. Working under this assumption, a comparison of 
the two cross-lagged coefficients may provide a valid inference as to 
the relative causal ~otency of each variable with respect to the other. 
Time - A 





Variable - 2 
Figure 1. Schematic Representation of the 
Cross-Lagged Panel Analysis Design 
21 
Time - B 
r BV1/BV2 
For example, let us suppose that AV1/BV2 exceeds AV2/BV1 by a consid-
erable margin. Under these conditions one could infer that Vl effects 
V2 more than V2 effects Vl, since prior performance in Vl is a better 
predictor of subsequent performance in V2 than the other way around. 
This is, of course, an inference that could never have been ·made on 
the basis of synchronous correlations alone, no matter how many sets 
of such correlations one had. 
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The phrase "relative causal potency" used above points out another 
interesting, indeed crucial, feature of the CLPA. It is increasingly 
recognized (Bandura, 1978; Coleman, Butcher, & Carson, 1980; Crano et 
al., 1972; Rogosa, 1980), for example, that causality, especially in 
the domain studied by the social sciences, is seldom a unidir~ctional 
affair. Variables frequently affect one another over time in a recip-
rocal or feedback fashion, a vicious circle or snowball effect. The 
CLPA, unlike more rigidly experimental designs, allows us to evaluate 
any causal reciprocity which might obtain between the variables. For 
example, let us say that correlation AV1/BV2 is meaningfully greater 
than AV2/BVl, but that both coefficients are statistically significant. 
From this we might infer that Vl and V2 each affect the other but that 
Vl has the greater causal potency. 
The ability of the CLPA to evaluate reciprocal causality is 
especially relevant in the study of psychopathology, which can often 
be seen as a vicious circle over time. A person's emotional disturbance 
will lead him to behave in certain ways toward other people, who will 
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then react to him in ways influenced by the original person's behavior. 
A depressed person, for example, might withdraw socially to some extent 
which might, in turn, cause other people to stop seeking him out, which 
may make him more depressed, and so on. A paranoid individual, being 
suspicious that his associates are "watching him," might begin to act 
in a secretive way, which, in turn, might cause the others around him 
to begin to watch him more carefully, etc. A traditional controlled 
experiment might be able to show that depression causes social with-
drawal, or that social withdrawal leads to a negative response from 
the social environment or that negative environmental responses 
heighten depression; but no single controlled experiment could assess 
the impact of the interaction of these variables over time. The CLPA 
provides at least a start in this d~rection. 
As discussed by Rogosa (1980), the CLPA is not an infallible 
research tool. Even in the case where statistically significant dif-
ferences exist between the cross-lagged correlations, one cannot be 
certain of the interpretation to be applied to the data. Furthermore, 
the probability of such an error in interpretation is difficult, if 
not impossible, to assess. As pointed out by DeWolfe (Note 2), however, 
the CLPA is a reasonable "eyeball technique" with which to make initial, 
tentative inferences concerning the relationships between variables 
which are difficult to study under more rigorous conditions. In the 
present study the CLPA design has been used to explore the causal in-
terplay between irrational thinking and depression. 
Questionnaires including the four psychological tests described 
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above, along with a variety of questions of a demographic nature were 
distributed to the volunteers who had agreed to participate in the 
study. Of the original 100 volunteers, a total of 18 either failed to 
return the questionnaires or submitted them in such a fashion as to 
render them unusable (incorrect identifications, etc.), leaving a total 
of 82 valid questionnaires in the first wave of testing. Six weeks 
later, these 82 volunteers were again contacted and 67 of them com-
pleted a second set of the psychological tests. The 15 subjects who 
participated in the first wave of testing but failed to complete the 
second were either impossible to reach, declined further participation, 
or submitted invalid questionnaires for the second wave. T-values were 
computed for the differences between the mean scores achieved on the 
four psychological tests during the first administration by those who 
-
went on to complete the second wave of testing and those who did not. 




Comparison of IBT, BDI, DACL and MMPI-D Scores 
(First Testing Occasion) Dropouts vs. Stayers 
Variable N X SD t df(Poo1ed) R(two-tailed) 
IBT 
Dropouts 16 248.4 21.5 
Stayers 66 245.9 24.5 0.38 80 0.708 (NS) 
BDI 
Dropouts 16 6.75 9.8 
Stayers 65 5.46 5.5 o. 71 79 0.482 (NS) 
DACL 
Dropouts 16 8.13 5.2 
Stayers 66 6.76 4.3 1.10 80 0.276 (NS) 
MMPI-D 
Dropouts 16 20.1 7.1 
Stayers 66 18.4 5.0 1.11 80 0.270 (NS) 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table II through Table V present the frequencies, means and 
standard deviations of the scores on the four psychological tests 
employed for the 67 subjects included in the analysis. Figures II, 
III, and IV portray the complete results of the cross-lagged panel 
analysis of the IBT with the BDI, the DACL and the MMPI-D, respectively. 
Each of th.e three pairs of synchronous correlations remained 
reasonably stationary over the six-week time period. That is, the 
strength of association between the I~T and the three measures of 
depression did not change substantially from one testing to the next. 
The horizontal correlations, which represent the test-retest relia-
bility of the var~ous measures employed, are all adequately high, 
ranging from . 71 for the IBT and the DACL, to • 82 for the BDI. 
H.ypothesis #1, that a positive association would be found between 
the measures of irrational thinking and depression, is strongly supported 
by these results. A glance at the synchronous values shows that the 
simple correlations between the IBT and the three measures. of depression 
are quite similar to the .53 obtained in the Nelson (J977) study 
between the IBT and the BDI. The two synchronous IB.T/BDI correlations 
(~aken at two points in time six weeks apart) are .57 and .52. Syn-
chronous correlations between the IBT and the other measures of 




Frequencies, Means and Standard Deviations - IBT 
First Testing Occasion 
Frequencies: 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) Cumulative Freq.(%) 
187 1 1.5 1.5 
195 1 1.5 3.0 
208 1 1.5 4.5 
210 1 1.5 6.0 
213 1 1.5 7.5 
216 1 1.5 9.0 
218 2 3.0 11.9 
219 2 3.0 14.9 
221 1 1.5 16.4 
222 1 1.5 17.9 
223 1 1.5 19.4 
225 1 1.5 20.9 
229 2 3.o· 23.9 
231 1 1.6 25.4 
232 4 6.0 31.3 
233 3 4.5 35.8 
234 1 1.5 37.3 
239 1 1.5 38.8 
240 1 1.5 40.3 
241 1 1.5 41.8 
242 1 1.5 43.3 
243 1 1.5 44.8 
244 1 1.5 46.3 
245 2 3.0 49.3 
247 2 3.0 52.2 
248 2 3.0 55.2 
249 2 3.0 58.2 
250 2 3.0 61.2 
252 1 1.5 62.7 
254 2 3.0 65.7 
255 1 1.5 67.2 
256 1 1.5 68.7 
258 1 1.5 70.1 
261 1 1.5 71.6 
262 2 3.0 74.6 
263 1 1.5 76.1 
264 1 1.5 77.6 
266 1 1.5 79.1 
269 1 1.5 80.6 
270 1 1.5 82.1 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) Cumulative Freq. (%) 
271 2 3.0 85.1 
275 2 3.0 88.1 
276 2 3.0 91.0 
278 1 1.5 92.5 
280 1 1.5 94.0 
282 1 1.5 95.5 
288 1 1.5 97.0 
294 1 1.5 98.5 
324 1 1.5 100.0 
Total: 67 100.0 
Mean: 246.373 
Standard Deviation: 24.662 
Second Testing Occasion 
Frequencies: 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) Cumulative Freq. (%) 
178 1 1.5 1.5 
188 1 1.5 3.0 
190 1 1.5 4.5 
198 1 1.5 6.1 
199 1 1.5 7.6 
200 1 1.5 9.1 
202 2 3.0 12.1 
206 1 1.5 13.6 
214 1 1.5 15.2 
215 1 1.5 16.7 
216 1 1.5 18.2 
218 3 4.5 22.7 
219 1 1.5 24.2 
220 1 1.5 25.8 
221 1 1.5 27.3 
222 1 1.5 28.8 
223 1 1.5 30.3 
224 4 6.0 36.4 
225 1 1.5 37.9 
226 1 1.5 39.4 
227 1 1.5 40.9 
229 1 1.5 42.4 
232 1 1.5 43.9 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Score Absolute Freg. Relative Freg. (%) Cumulative Freg. (%) 
234 2 3.0 47 .o 
235 1 1.5 48.5 
236 3 4.5 53.0 
237 1 1.5 54.4 
239 1 1.5 56.1 
242 1 1.5 57.6 
243 4 6.0 63.6 
247 2 3.0 66.7 
248 1 1.5 68.2 
249 1 1.5 69.7 
251 1 1.5 71.2 
253 1 1.5 72.7 
255 3 4.5 77.3 
256 1 1.5 78.8 
257 1 1.5 80.3 
258 1 1.5 81.8 
261 1 1.5 83.3 
264 1 1.5 84.8 
267 2 3.0 87.9 
268 1 1.5 89.4 
270 1 1.5 90.9 
271 1 1.5 92.4 
274 2 3.0 95.5 
283 1 1.5 97 .o 
293 1 1.5 98.5 
334 1 1.5 100.0 
Missing 1 1.5 100.0 
Total: 67 100.0 
Mean: 237.273 
Standard Deviation: 27.114 
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Table 3 
Frequencies, Means and Standard Deviations - BDI 
First Testing Occasion 
Frequencies: 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) Cumulative Freq. (%) 
0 8 11.9 12.1 
1 6 9.0 21.2 
2 8 11.9 33.3 
3 7 10.4 43.9 
4 6 9.0 53.0 
5 6 9.0 62.1 
6 5 7.5 69.7 
7 3 4.5 74.2 
8 1 1.5 75.8 
9 2 3.0 78.8 
10 4 6.0 84.8 
11 3 4.5 89.4 
12 1 1.5 90.9 
13 2 3.0 93.9 
14 2 3.0 97.0 
19 1 1.5 98.5 
33 1 1.5 100.0 
Missing 1 1.5 100.0 
Total: 67 100.0 
Mean: 5.530 
Standard Deviation: 5.503 
Second Testing Occasion 
Frequencies: 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) Cumulative Freq.(%) 
0 16 23.9 24.2 
1 9 13.4 37.9 
2 9 13.4 51.5 
3 9 13.4 65.2 
4 4 6.0 71.2 
5 4 6.0 77.3 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) Cumulative Freq.(%) 
6 3 4.5 81.8 
7 3 4.5 86.4 
9 3 4.5 90.9 
10 3 4.5 95.5 
12 1 1.5 97.0 
15 1 1.5 98.5 
29 1 1.5 100.0 
Missing 1 1.5 100.0 
Total: 67 100.0 
Mean: 3.667 
Standard Deviation: 4.659 
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Table 4 
Frequencies, Means and Standard Deviations - DACL 
First Testing Occasion 
Frequencies: 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) Cumulative Freq. (%) 
2 7 10.4 10.4 
3 9 13.4 23.9 
4 9 13.4 37.3 
5 3 4.5 41.8 
6 9 13.4 55.2 
7 7 10.4 65.7 
8 5 7.5 73.1 
9 3 4.5 77.6 
10 4 6.0 83.6 
11 3 4.5 88.1 
12 4 6.0 94.0 
14 1 1.5 95.5 
17 1 1.5 97.0 
18 1 1.5 98.5 
25 1 1.5 100.0 
Total: 67 100.0 
Mean: 6.821 
Standard Deviatiort: 4.289 
Second Testing Occasion 
Frequencies: 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) Cumulative Freq. (%) 
0 2 3.0 3.0 
1 4 6.0 9.1 
2 5 7.5 16.7 
3 6 9.0 25.8 
4 7 10.4 36.4 
5 11 16.4 53.0 
6 5 7.5 60.6 
7 8 11.9 72.7 
8 4 6.0 78.8 
9 1 1.5 80.3 
10 2 3.0 83.3 
Table 4 (Continued) 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) 
11 3 4.5 
12 2 3.0 
14 1 1.5 
15 1 1.5 
16 1 1.5 
20 2 3.0 
24 1 1.5 
Missing 1 1.5 
Total: 67 100.0 
Mean: 6.485 
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Frequencies, Means and Standard Deviations - MMPI-D 
First Testing Occasion 
Frequencies: 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) Cumulative Freq. (%) 
8 1 1.5 1.5 
9 1 1.5 3.0 
11 3 4.5 7.5 
12 2 3.0 10.4 
13 2 3.0 13.4 
14 3 4.5 17.9 
15 3 4.5 22.4 
16 10 14.9 37.3 
17 3 4.5 41.8 
18 8 11.9 53.7 
19 7 10.4 64.2 
20 4 6.0 70.1 
21 4 6.0 76.1 
22 5 7.5 83.6 
23 3 4.5 88.1 
24 1 1.5 89~6 
25 1 1.5 91.0 
26 2 3.0 94.0 
27 1 1.5 95.5 
28 2 3.0 98.5 
37 1 1.5 100.0 
Total: 67 100.0 
Mean: 18.493 
Standard Deviation: 4.955 
Second Testing Occasion 
Frequencies: 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) Cumulative Freq. (%) 
6 1 1.5 1.5 
8 1 1.5 3.0 
9 2 3.0 6.1 
10 3 4.5 10.6 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Score Absolute Freq. Relative Freq. (%) Cumulative Freq. (%) 
11 3 4.5 15.2 
12 4 6.0 21.2 
13 3 4.5 25.8 
14 2 3.0 28.8 
15 4 6.0 34.8 
16 5 7.5 42.4 
17 7 10.4 53.0 
18 7 10.4 63.6 
19 6 9.0 72.7 
20 5 7.5 80.3 
21 1 1.5 81.8 
24 1 1.5 83.3 
25 2 3.0 86.4 
26 4 6.0 92.4 
27 1 1.5 93.9 
28 1 1.5 95.5 
32 1 1.5 97.0 
35 1 1.5 98.5 
36 1 1.5 100.0 
Missing 1 1.5 100.0 
Total: 67 100.0 
Mean: 17.667 
Standard Deviation: 6.160 
First Testing 
IBT 
r = .57 
.E. <.00001 
r = .42 
.E. <.001 
Second Testing 
r = .71 IBT 
.E. <.00001 
r = .52 
.£. <.00001 
r = .82 
.£. <. 00001 
BDI BDI 
Figure 2. Cross-Lagged Panel Analysis IBT With BDI 
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First Testing Second Testing 
r = • 71 IBT 
.E. <.00001 
r = .45 
.E. <.000 1 
r = .50 r = .61 
.E. <.00001 .E. <. 00001 
r = • 71 
DACL .E. <. 00001 DACL 
Figure 3. Cross-Lagged Panel Analy~is - IBT With DACL 
First Testing 
IBT 
r = .39 
.E. <.001 
MMPI-D 
r = .35 
:E: <.o1 
r = • 71 
.E. <. 00001 
r = .75 
.E. <. 00001 
Second Testing 
IBT 
r = .50 
£. <. 0001 
MMPI-D 
Figure 4. Cross-Lagged Panel Analysis - IBT with MMPI-D 
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are thus supported and generalized by the present results: supported 
since the specific IBT/BDI correlations obtained are very similar 
indeed to those found by Nelson, and generalized in that essentially 
similar results were obtained using two additional measures of depres-
sion, in a different population, at a different point in time. 
Hypothesis #2, that the causal relationship between irrational 
thinking and depression would prove to be partially reciprocal rather 
than unidirectional in character, is also supported by these data. 
All six of the cross-lagged correlations are highly significant sta-
tistically, and all are fairly substantial in value, ranging from .39 
to .60. This suggests there is a vicious circle or feedback relation-
ship between irrational thinking and depression, a "snowball effect" in 
which each variable effects the other over the course of time. Which~ 
ever phenomenon occurs first, it tends to precipitate the subsequent 
development of the other. 
With respect to Hypothesis #3, that the preponderance of causal 
potency would run in the direction of irrational thinking causing 
depression, the cross-lagged values show a consistent pattern. In each 
case the correlation of the measure of depression at time point-one 
with irrational thinking at time point-two is greater than the correla-
tion of irrational thinking at time point-one with depression at time 
point-two. None of the differences between the pairs of cross-lagged 
correlations is significant statistically. A meaningful trend may 
perhaps be inferred, however, from the fact that each of the prior 
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depression/subsequent irrational thinking values is substantially 
greater than the corresponding prior irrational thinking/subsequent 
depression coefficient. To the degree that such an inference is legi-
timate, it runs counter to the research hypothesis in the present 
investigation. The trend in the present data suggests that depression, 
as measured by the BDI, the MMPI-D, and the DACL, tends to lead to 
irrational thinking, as measured by the IBT, more than the other way 
around. 2 
The above results support what we might call a "weak" version of 
the cognitive-behavioral hypothesis voiced by Ellis, Beck, and others. 
Irrational thinking is implicated to some degree in the subsequent 
development of other depressive symptoms. In the present study the 
correlations between irrational thinking at time-point-one and depres~ 
sion at time-point-two ranged from .35 to .45. Between 12 and 20% of 
the variance in the depression scores in the second wave of testing 
was, therefore, tied to the levels of irrational thinking on the first 
2rt should be noted that although the emphasis in the above 
remarks is on the pathology, that is, the interpretations are focused 
on depression and irrational thinking, the converse interpretations, 
dealing with the relationships between the lackof depressive symptoms 
and low irrationality, are supported to precisely the same degree by 
the present data. 
testing occasion. To this limited extent it can be maintained that 
these results support the notion that irrational thinking "causes" 
depression. 
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These results are not consistent, however, with a "stronger" 
version of the cognitive hypothesis, which suggests the way one thinks 
is the prime or preponderant causal agent in the development of emo-
tional difficulties. It may, of course, be that different measures of 
irrational thinking, or of other cognitive characteristics would 
demonstrate a greater causal role for cognition in the genesis of 
psychopathology. 
From a clinical point of view, the relative strength of the 
variables in the development of the depressive syndrome is less impor-
tant than the apparent circularity of the overall causal pattern. 
This circularity implies that a therapeutic intervention might profit-
ably be made at any point in the depressive cycle, which may include 
the patient's cognitions, affect and overt behavior, as well as the 
environmental responses to his behavior (See Figure V). If the 
individual acts in a depressed, socially maladaptive way, he is likely 
to experience negative social responses, which may serve to intensify 
his depressed cognitions and mood, thus perpetuating the cycle. 
The therapeutic decision to intervene at one or another of the 
points in the vicious circle can be based on the clinician's estimate 
of the relative "cost effectiveness" of the possible interventions. 











Figure V. Hypothesized vicious circle of factors in 
the depressive syndrome, in which each 
ingredient can precipitate the next--leading 
to an intensification of symptoms. Arrows 
represent causal influence. 
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causal agent in the depressive cycle, it may be that a strategy aimed 
at directly changing the patient's affect would meet with considerable 
resistance. In such a case an intervention designed to change cognitive 
or overt behavior might be more efficient. In any case, the clinician's 
perception of the cyclical nature of .the problem will facilitate the 
recognition of additional treatment options. 
There is an obvious need for additional research aimed at clari-
fying the relationship of cognition and affect, in depression specif-
ically and psychopathology in general. Analyses using different mea-
sures of cognitive style might further such a clarification. Research 
investigating the causal role of thinking in the development of other 
emotional difficulties thought to involve cognitive components, such 
as paranoia or schizophrenia, would also help clarify this relation-
ship. 
Studies aimed at exposing the complex causal patterns in psycho-
pathology are especially needed. Social scientists have labored too 
long under the delusion that unidirectional causality, a paradigm 
borrowed from the natural sciences, applies as well to the study of 
human behavior as it does to physics. Psychologists, and especially 
clinicians, need to understand the complex reciprocal determinism 
involved in our areas of study. We must come to appreciate the inter-
active causality involved in the dynamic processes referred to as 
personality and psychopathology. Only through such an appreciation 
can we hope to develop the full range of research and clinical strategies 
needed to realize the ultimate goal of breaking the vicious circles 
which seem to underlie so much human suffering. 
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